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The Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Fairchild 
 
 In this case a citizen called the police to report what he believed was a 
suspicious transaction occurring on a dead-end street in his neighborhood, 
where he had seen suspicious occurrences in the past, when a car and a truck 
pulled up quickly and the occupant of the car got out and entered the truck 
where he was for about ten minutes. (State’s Exhibit 2.)  An officer responded, 
knew that the truck was registered to a person with a known drug history, parked 
his patrol car where he could observe and, when the vehicles took off, stopped 
the car.  (Tr., p. 19, L. 25 – p. 24, L. 18.)  Application of the law to the facts in this 
case shows the officer had reasonable suspicion that Fairchild was involved in a 
drug transaction.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.)   
The district court erred by failing to consider the totality of the 
circumstances, instead, and contrary to applicable legal standards, discounting 
or ignoring circumstances because of possible innocent explanations.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.)  In response to the state’s argument, Fairchild argues 
that the district court properly downplayed evidence that Fairchild was engaged 
in a “transaction,” that the two individuals left when the officer parked within 
sight, and that the truck was registered to someone with a known drug history.  
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 6-14.)  Fairchild’s attempt to limit the scope of the 




 Fairchild argues there was no reasonable suspicion that he was engaged 
in a “transaction” in the truck, but only speculation that he was.  (Respondent’s 
brief, pp. 9-10, see also p. 13.)  He argues that this conclusion is reasonable 
because the citizen reported being “‘concerned about a transaction or something 
going down behind my house.’”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 9 (emphasis original) 
(citing State’s Exhibit 2 at 0:00-0:10).)  He argues the citizen “did not know it was 
a transaction because, as the district court found, he did not see a transaction 
occur.”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 9.)  Fairchild cites no authority for the proposition 
that it is unreasonable to suspect criminal activity unless a citizen or witness has 
seen the crime committed.  The law is contrary to his argument.  See, e.g., 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (headlong flight may give rise to 
reasonable suspicion); State v. Gottardi, 161 Idaho 21, 383 P.3d 700, 707 
(Ct. App. 2016) (officers had reasonable suspicion of drug activity where: “the 
facts the officer possessed when he approached Gottardi outside the apartment 
were that Gottardi had some familiarity with the wanted felon, the felon was 
wanted on drug charges, and Gottardi had engaged in ‘lookout behavior’ and 
‘suspicious’ behavior indicative of drug activity”); State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 
Idaho 609, 615, 329 P.3d 391, 397 (Ct. App. 2014); (“reasonable suspicion does 
not require a belief that any specific criminal activity is afoot to justify an 
investigative detention; instead, all that is required is a showing of objective and 
specific articulable facts giving reason to believe that the individual has been or 
is about to be involved in some criminal activity” (emphasis original)). 
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 Fairchild next argues that the fact that the vehicles took off when the 
officer arrived and parked within sight of them, one of them driving through a 
field, was not suspicious because there was no direct evidence that the drivers’ 
motivation was to avoid the officer and this was “not part of the facts found by 
the district court.”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 10.)  As a matter of law, however, 
efforts to avoid law enforcement can be suspicious, Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 
(flight can provide reasonable suspicion); Padilla v. State, 161 Idaho 624, ___, 
389 P.3d 169, 171-72 (2016) (same), so Fairchild’s argument reinforces, rather 
than refutes, the state’s argument that the district court failed to include the 
totality of the circumstances in its analysis. 
 Fairchild next argues that the district court properly excluded from the 
totality of the circumstances the fact that the registered owner of the truck had a 
drug history.  (Respondent’s brief, p. 13.)  Specifically, Fairchild argues this fact 
was properly found “not suspicious” because “‘it is unclear whether that was 
even the same individual driving the truck that day.’”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 13 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting R., p. 85).)  Again, this argument reinforces, rather 
than refutes, the state’s argument that the district court erred by excluding some 
of the facts from the totality of the circumstances because they are subject to 
innocent explanations. 
 The purpose of an investigative stop is “to confirm or dispel the officers’ 
suspicion.”  State v. Williams, No. 43129, 2016 WL 4492579, at *7 (Idaho Ct. 
App. Aug. 26, 2016) (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-
81 (1975)); see also State v. Simmons, 120 Idaho 672, 677, 818 P.2d 787, 792 
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(Ct. App. 1991).  That the suspicious circumstances might in fact be completely 
innocent does not render an investigative stop unreasonable.  Navarette v. 
California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1691 (2014); United States v. Arvizu, 
534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (“A determination that reasonable suspicion exists, 
however, need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”).  This is true 
even if it is considerably more likely that the conduct is innocent than that it is 
criminal.  Navarette, ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S.Ct. at 1687; United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (“level of suspicion” required for investigative stop 
“is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the 
evidence”).  Here the district court erred by rejecting some of the circumstances 
underlying the officer’s suspicion because they were capable of innocent 
explanation.  Fairchild essentially advocates for this Court to commit the same 
error.  When the totality of the circumstances is considered under the proper 
legal standards, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Fairchild’s car to 




The District Court Erred In Its Application Of The Attenuation Doctrine  
 
 Fairchild’s arrest and search after discovery of an outstanding arrest 
warrant was an intervening circumstance rendering discovery of the 
methamphetamine beyond the scope of the exclusionary rule under the 
attenuation doctrine even if the initial stop were invalid.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-
14.)  Specifically, the state contends that the district court erroneously concluded 
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that the arrest occurred, and the search started, before the warrant was 
discovered.  (Id.)  In fact, the arrest and search occurred only after dispatch 
informed the officer of the outstanding warrant.  (Id.) 
 On appeal Fairchild does not dispute that the officer was informed of the 
outstanding arrest warrant prior to the arrest and search, but asserts the arrest 
and search incident thereto were unlawful because “the warrant was not 
confirmed as valid until after Mr. Fairchild was arrested and searched.”  
(Respondent’s brief, p. 15 (emphasis original).)  This argument is without legal 
basis. 
 The officer testified that the procedure followed in his agency was that, 
once he reported the name of a contact to dispatch, dispatch ran that name first 
through a database for outstanding warrants.  (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 4-9.)  If a warrant 
came up on the database, dispatch informed the officer, and then got the “actual 
paperwork” and looked “at the warrant to verify that the warrant is still valid and 
not just in their database.”  (Tr., p. 34, L. 22 – p. 35, L. 2; p. 36, Ls. 11-24; p. 37, 
Ls. 10-14.)  The officer conducted an initial search of Fairchild after dispatch 
informed him of the warrant, but before dispatch informed him that it had pulled 
the actual paperwork to confirm the warrant.  (Tr., p. 34, L. 18 – p. 35, L. 5; p. 36, 
L. 11 – p. 39, L. 18; State’s Exhibit 3.)  Under these facts,1 because the officer 
searched and arrested Fairchild only after learning of the existence of the arrest 
                                            
1 The district court’s factual findings are consistent with this testimony and the 
video of the encounter, with the exception of when the warrant was “discovered.”  
(R., pp. 80-82, 92.)  As already shown, however, that finding is clearly erroneous 
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-14) and Fairchild does not argue otherwise 
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 2-3, 15-16).   
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warrant, discovery and execution of the warrant attenuated any taint even if the 
initial stop was invalid.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-14.)   
 The only authority Fairchild cites holds that discovery of a valid warrant is 
a prerequisite to application of the attenuation doctrine.  (Respondent’s brief, 
pp. 17-19.)  The state does not contend otherwise.  Because both parties agree 
that a valid warrant is required, but both parties also agree the warrant in this 
case was valid, this argument is irrelevant.  Fairchild has cited no authority for his 
only relevant argument, that the second step in the process used by police in this 
case—physically pulling the paperwork to confirm the validity of the warrant—
must be completed prior to a constitutionally valid arrest and search.  
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 14-21.)  Review of the law shows not only an absence 
of support for Fairchild’s argument, but that the argument is directly contrary to 
applicable law. 
 It is beyond cavil that the constitutionality of a search incident to arrest 
depends on a lawful arrest.  See State v. Calegar, 104 Idaho 526, 529, 661 P.2d 
311, 314 (1983); State v. Baxter, 144 Idaho 672, 680, 168 P.3d 1019, 1027 
(Ct. App. 2007); State v. McIntee, 124 Idaho 803, 805, 864 P.2d 641, 643 
(Ct. App. 1993).  An arrest pursuant to an invalid warrant is unlawful, and 
requires suppression of evidence seized in any search incident thereto.  State v. 
Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 272 P.3d 483 (2012) (rejecting application of good faith 
exception where arrest was pursuant to invalid warrant of attachment); see also 
State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 11 P.3d 489 (Ct. App. 2000) (arrest of defendant 
on warrant for different person with similar name and description required 
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suppression of evidence found incident to arrest).  This standard has been 
consistently applied under facts such as those present in this case to uphold 
searches incident to arrest conducted only upon a report of the existence of an 
arrest warrant by dispatch, without more.  See, e.g., State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 
610, 611, 7 P.3d 219, 220 (2000) (“The check with dispatch revealed an 
outstanding arrest warrant from the City of Caldwell.”); State v. Pedersen, 
157 Idaho 790, 791, 339 P.3d 1194, 1195 (Ct. App. 2014) (“After dispatch 
indicated that Pedersen had an active arrest warrant, Jagosh arrested and 
handcuffed Pedersen.”); State v. Bowman, 134 Idaho 176, 178, 997 P.2d 637, 
639 (Ct. App. 2000) (“Ada County dispatch confirmed the existence of an 
outstanding misdemeanor warrant for Bowman.”).   
Likewise, an arrest on a valid warrant after dispatch reports the warrant 
attenuates searches incident to arrest from any illegality in the initial detentions.  
Utah v. Strieff, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016) (“Officer Fackrell 
relayed Strieff’s information to a police dispatcher, who reported that Strieff had 
an outstanding arrest warrant”); State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 
454, 456 (2004) (“Officer Marshall was then told by dispatch that Page had an 
outstanding warrant for his arrest”).  Like the search incident to arrest cases cited 
above, the courts in neither Strieff nor Page required any special steps to confirm 
the validity of the warrant, much less imposed a constitutional requirement that 
the warrant itself be pulled and examined prior to the arrest or search.  This case 
is factually indistinguishable from Strieff and Page and other search incident to 
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arrest cases where an officer relied on a report of an arrest warrant provided by 
dispatch.   
 In this case the district court distinguished Page on the basis that “the 
warrant was discovered after the Defendant had been unlawfully arrested.” 
(R., p. 92 (emphasis original).)  That factual finding is clearly erroneous; dispatch 
reported the warrant to the officer prior to the search or arrest.  Page argues it is 
legally significant that dispatch had not yet confirmed the warrant by pulling the 
paperwork to make sure it was entered in the database correctly.  He has failed, 
however, to show that this fact has any legal significance.  Multiple cases show it 
does not.  Because the officer was informed of a valid warrant, and took steps to 
enforce that warrant, the attenuation doctrine applies even if the initial stop was 
invalid.  The district court erred by suppressing evidence of methamphetamine 
possession by Fairchild. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s 
order granting suppression and remand for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 10th day of May, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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